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Abstract: This paper looks at the question of direct
participation in cyber hostilities under the international law
of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law (IHL)
as it is also known. The paper examines the history and
development of the concept of direct participation in
hostilities by civilians, which serves as an exception to the
principle of civilian or non-combatant immunity. In charting
the development of the concept, this paper looks at landmark
attempts to legally define the concept of direct participation,
including the Israeli Targeted Killings case, and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study into
direct participation. Using this legal background, this paper
then analogises direct participation in the context of cyber
hostilities, and critically examines the ways in which civilians
may be deemed to be directly participating in cyber
hostilities. The paper also posits some solutions to
potentially problematic situations raised by civilian
participation in cyber warfare.
Keywords: international humanitarian law, direct
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber warfare has been the focus of considerable attention
recently, due largely to highly publicized cyber-attacks against
Georgia, 1 Estonia, 2 and Iran. 3 Academics and practitioners have
1 See Stephen Korns and Joshua Kastenberg, "Georgia's Cyber Left Hook," 38 Parameters
60 (2008-2009).
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analyzed and dissected the concept of cyber war, delving into the
myriad of international law issues raised by the practice-both actual
and hypothetical-of cyber warfare. Areas covered include the law on
the use of force and self-defense;4 State responsibility;5 questions of
attribution; 6 and problems of distinction, proportionality and
targeting.7 One particularly vexing issue is that of direct participation
in cyber hostilities-when can one be considered as participating in
cyber hostilities?
The law regarding direct participation in hostilities (DPH) has also
been subject to considerable analysis in recent years, due to work
undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
and case law from domestic and international courts. Determining
direct participation in "conventional" hostilities is complex;
determining direct participation in cyber-hostilities is especially so. Is
the person who inputs the malicious code taking direct part? The
person who writes, but does not execute the code? The person who
gives the order for the code to be written in the first place? This paper
will look at the question of direct participation in cyber hostilities, and
examine the complexities regarding when an individual may be
considered as taking direct part in hostilities. The concept of DPH is
2 Ian Traynor, "Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia," The Guardian,
17 May 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia; Joshua
Davis, "Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe," Wired, 21 August 2007
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-o9/ff-estonia.
3 John Markoff, "A Silent Attack, But Not a Subtle One," The New York Times, 26
September 2oo, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technology/27virus.html.
4 Matthew Hoisington, "Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-
Defence," 32 BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 439 (2009).
5 Nikhil D'Souza, Cyber Warfare and State Responsibility: Developments in International
Law (16 May 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1842984 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.1842984,
accessed 3 January 2012.
6 Jeffrey Hunker, Bob Hutchinson, and Jonathan Margulies, Role and Challenges for
Sufficient Cyber-Attack Attribution, White Paper, Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection, Dartmouth College, 2008, http://www.thei3p.org/docs/publications/
whitepaper-attribution.pdf.
7 See Ruth Wedgwood, "Proportionality, Cyberwar and the Law of War," 76 Int'lL Stud 219
(2000); James Terry, "The Lawfulness of Attacking Computer Networks in Armed Conflict
and in Self-Defence in Periods Short of Armed Conflict: What are the Targeting
Constraints?," 169 MilL Rev 70 (2001); Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, "Hacking into International
Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare," 106 Mich L
Rev 1427 (2008).
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multifaceted, both in and of itself, and due to its interconnectedness to
a number of other concepts in the law of armed conflict. These include
definitional issues regarding combatants and civilians, along with the
law regarding military objectives, targeting, and the principle of
distinction-concepts all worthy of their own separate analyses. To
address them in any detail is beyond the scope of this paper, so this
paper will focus solely on the concept of DPH.
The first part of this paper will examine the historical development
of the concept of direct participation. The second part will analyze
how DPH has been interpreted in law and in practice, incorporating
the recent publication by the ICRC8 of their Interpretive Guidance on
Direct Participation in Hostilities. The third part of this paper will
examine what direct participation in cyber hostilities might entail by
exploring some theoretical scenarios and suggesting some solutions to
the complicated question of DPH and cyber war.
II. DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
The term "direct participation in hostilities" refers to the notion
that, as a general rule, civilians are not to be made the target of
attacks, unless and for such time as they directly participate in
hostilities. This is also known as the rule on non-combatant
immunity.9 Direct participation acts as an exemption to the principle
of civilian immunity. Direct participation is an idea that developed
from the writings of some of the earliest publicists of international
law,1o and was an integral part of the discourse relating to the law of
armed conflicts throughout the nineteenth century. The concept can
be seen in the writings of publicistsll and in documents like the Lieber
8 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the Assembly of the International
Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February 2009, published in 90 IRRC 991 (2oo8)
(hereinafter DPHIG).
9 For an overview of the principle of non-combatant immunity, see Judith Gardam, Non-
Combatant Immunity in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1993).
10 Grotius argued that, "by the law of war armed men and those who offer resistance are
killed ... [it] is right that in war those who have taken up arms should pay the penalty, but
that the guiltless should not be injured." Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book
III, Chapter III, Section IX, in L. Friedman (ed.) The Law of War: A Documentary History
(Random House 1972).
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Code, adopted by the U.S. Union Army during the American Civil
War. 12
In the earliest attempts to codify the laws of war, non-combatant
immunity was central. For instance, Article 1 of the Oxford Manual of
the Laws of War, a non-binding document that sought to codify "the
accepted ideas of our age so far as this has appeared allowable and
practicable,"13 states that "the state of war does not admit of acts of
violence, save between the armed forces of belligerent States. Persons
not forming part of a belligerent armed force should abstain from such
acts."14 While the next major iteration of the laws of war-this time in
binding treaty form as the Hague Regulations 15 -did not include
explicit reference to the idea of non-combatant immunity, nor to the
idea of direct participation in hostilities, the literature of the time
continued to affirm the principle. As Risley wrote in 1897, non-
belligerent subjects of a party to the conflict:
are not liable to be killed or taken as prisoners of war as
long as they do not actively engage in hostilities ....
[C]ombatants must be open enemies, known and
knowable, and non-combatants must be harmless. As
soon as an individual ceases to be harmless, he ceases
As argued in Wheaton's Elements oflnternationalLaw: "[no] use of force against an
enemy is lawful, unless it is necessary to accomplish the purposes of war. The custom of
civilised nations, founded upon this principle, has therefore exempted ... [all] public or
private individuals engaged in the ordinary civil pursuits of life, from the direct effect of
military operations, unless actually taken in arms, or guilty of some misconduct in
violation of the usages of war, by which they forfeit their immunity." Henry Wheaton,
Elements ofInternational Law, ed. Richard Dana, (Oxford 1936), § 345 at 362.
2Instructions for the Government of Armies of the U.S. in the Field, General Orders, 24
Aprill863; promulgated as General Orders No.loo (hereinafter Lieber Code); reprinted
in D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds.), The Laws ofArmed Conflicts : A Collection of
Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 4th ed. (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). Article
22 of the Lieber Code stated that "the principle has been more and more acknowledged
that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honour as much as the
exigencies of war will admit"; this provision was to be read in light of Article 15, which
stated that, "Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies."
13 Preamble, Oxford Manual on the Laws of War, reprinted in D. Schindler and J. Toman
(eds.), The Laws ofArmed Conflicts at 29-41.
14 Article 1, Oxford Manual on the Laws of War.
15 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907, 205 CTS
227.
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to be a non-combatant, and must be reckoned a
combatant; and unless he bears the distinguishing
marks of an open combatant, he puts himself outside
the laws of war.16
Non-combatant immunity, and the exception of DPH, remained at
the forefront of the law throughout the twentieth century. The 1949
Geneva Conventions17 excluded explicit reference to the idea of "direct
participation in hostilities," 1S but efforts towards reaffirming the
principles behind DPH continued. In 1956, the ICRC issued Draft
Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian
Population in Time of War, which noted that civilians should be
"outside the sphere of armed attacks," 19 defining the civilian
population in Article 4 as:
all persons not belonging to one or other of the
following categories: (a) members of the armed forces,
or of their auxiliary or complementary organisations;
i6 John Risley, The Law of War (Innes and Co. 1897) at 107-108.
17 Comprising Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter Geneva Convention I
or GCI) 75 UNTS 31 (1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949
(hereinafter Geneva Convention II or GCII) 75 UNTS 85 (1950); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter Geneva
Convention III, GCIII or the POW Convention) 75 UNTS 135 (1950); and Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949
(hereinafter Geneva Convention IV, GCIV, or the Civilians Convention) 75 UNTS 287
(1950).
18 Despite no explicit inclusion of the term in the Conventions, Article 3 common to all four
Conventions-also known as Common Article 3-did invoke the concept in stating its
applicability to "persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who had laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat. . ." That
"active" and "direct" should be considered as one and the same has been affirmed by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where the Court stated "these phrases are so
similar that, for the Chamber's purposes, they maybe treated as synonymous[.]" See
Prosecutor v Jean-PaulAkayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, § 629 (2 September
1998).
9 Article 1, Draft Rules.
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(b) persons who do not belong to the forces referred to
above, but nevertheless take part in the fighting.20
The concept of direct participation in hostilities was finally
expressly codified in the 1977 Additional Protocols.21 In Protocol I,
DPH is outlined in Article 51(3) providing that "civilians shall enjoy
the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities."22 Article 51(3) has had no
reservations to date.23 Indeed, the importance of the provision was
affirmed by a number of States,24 including the United Kingdom, who
declared the exception to the civilian immunity from attack
contained in Article 51(3) a "valuable reaffirmation" of an existing
rule of customary international law.25 DPH is outlined in Article
13(3) of Protocol II, and is worded similarly to Article 51(3) of Protocol
I.
20 This was echoed in Resolution XXVIII, from the 1965 International Conference of the
Red Cross, which reaffirmed need for all parties to the conflict to distinguish between
persons taking part in hostilities, and the civilian population.
21 The Additional Protocols comprise Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. See Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds.),
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of12
August 1949 (ICRC, 1987) at xix-xxxi (hereinafter AP Commentary).
22 The "protection afforded by this Section" refers to the prohibition contained in Article
51(), (2), (4)-(8) - which provide that civilians are not to be made the subject of attack,
and that civilians are to be protected from the dangers arising from military operations,
imposing prohibitions on parties to the conflict on conducting indiscriminate attacks, and
from using civilians to immunise military installations or sites.
23 Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3) (adopted by 77 votes in favour, one against and 16
abstentions).
24 See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conferences, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 164-204, M§
119-181.
25 Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 164, § 119. The importance of this provision was
affirmed in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which criminalises
attacks on civilians "not taking direct part in hostilities" under Article 8(2)(b)(i), (e)(i); UN
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 ILM 1002 (17 July 1998).
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III. DEFINING DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
When debating Article 51 of Protocol I, states did not settle on a
precise definition of what was meant by the phrase "direct part in
hostilities."26 The Commentary to the Additional Protocols states that:
The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to
an overriding condition, namely, on their abstaining
from all hostile acts. Hostile acts should be understood
to be acts which by their nature and purpose are
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and
equipment of the armed forces.27
While this commentary provides some insight, a number of issues
remain. For instance, what constitutes "hostilities"? Is there a specific
threshold? How does one determine the scope of "direct part" or
"unless and for such time"? Given the definitional ambiguities, it is
unsurprising that it was stated in the ICRC Study on the customary
status of international humanitarian law that "a precise definition of
the term 'direct participation in hostilities' does not exist."28 It was
with this fact in mind that the ICRC instigated a study into the concept
of "direct participation in hostilities." Conducted over the period of
five years, the project included questionnaires, reports, background
papers, and expert meetings. The final result of this study was the
publication of the Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in
Hostilities in 2009, which is discussed in more detail below.
At this same time, the Israeli Supreme Court also had occasion to
examine the question of DPH, in the 2006 case The Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel v The Government of Israel, known as the
26 See the Additional Protocols Official Records XV at 330, CDDH/III/224; see alsoAP
Commentary at 618-619, paragraphs 1942-1945; M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch and W. Solf, New
Rules for Victims ofArmed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) at 301-304, paragraphs 2.4 -
2.4.2.2 (hereinafter New Rules).
27AP Commentary at 618, par. 1942.
28 Jean Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, 2 volumes, Vol. I Rules, Vol. II Practice (2 parts), (ICRC, Geneva,
2005), Vol. I, at 22 (hereinafter referred to as ICRC CIHL Study).
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"Targeted Killings" case.29 The Court examined, amongst other issues,
the scope of Article 51(3) of Protocol I regarding direct participation.
First, the Court affirmed the customary status of the principle
behind Article 51(3), an important step as Israel is not party to
Additional Protocol I.30 The Court then analyzed the concept of DPH,
for the purposes of determining when a civilian was deemed to lose
his or her immunity from targeting. The Court took a functional
approach,31 mindful of being neither too narrow nor too broad. In this
respect, the Court noted the ICRC's Commentary on the Additional
Protocols which stated that, in determining the scope of direct
participation:
undoubtedly there is room here for some margin of
judgment: to restrict this concept to combat and active
military operations would be too narrow, while
extending it to the entire war effort would be too broad,
as in modern warfare the whole population participates
in the war effort to some extent, albeit indirectly.32
The Court thus identified certain categories of persons who could
be considered as taking direct part in hostilities. These included (a)
persons collecting intelligence on the armed forces; (b) persons
transporting unlawful combatants to or from the place where
hostilities are occurring; and (c) persons who operate weapons that
unlawful combatants use, or supervise their operation, or provide
service to them.33 The Court also considered civilians involved in
transporting ammunition to places for use in hostilities, as well as
persons acting as voluntary human shields should be considered as
taking direct part in hostilities.34 The Court explained:
29 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v The Government oflsrael (2006) HCJ
769/02; hereinafter the Targeted Killings case.
30 Targeted Killings case, §§ 23, 29-30.
31 Ibid., § 31.
32 AP Commentary at 516, par. 1679.
33 Targeted Killings, § 35.
34 Ibid., H§ 35, 36.
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[the] direct character of the part taken should not be
narrowed merely to the person committing the physical
act of attack, those who have sent him, as well, take 'a
direct part'. The same goes for the person who decided
upon the act, and the person who planned it. It is not to
be said about them that they are taking an indirect part
in hostilities.35
Excluded, however, were certain persons and acts from the scope
of DPH, including selling food and medicine to unlawful combatants;
providing general strategic analysis, logistical, and other general
support, including monetary aid; and distributing propaganda.36
Also examined was the question of duration of DPH-when
civilian immunity could be lost and when (and if) it was regained. The
Court stated that there was no accepted or agreed interpretation,37 but
conceded that a person who has ceased taking a direct part in
hostilities regains his or her protection from targeting.38 The Court
noted that it was necessary to draw the distinction between a person
who may take sporadic part, even if such participation was only a
single instance, and those persons who have actively joined a
"terrorist organization" and while within that organization, commit a
chain of hostile acts, even if there are short "rest" periods between
acts. 39 The Court noted that for a member of an organization, such
rest intervals did not constitute a cessation of active participation, but
rather a brief interlude preparatory to the commission of and
participation in the next hostile act.40
The Court determined that decisions regarding whether a civilian
could be targeted for taking direct part in hostilities needed to be
undertaken on a case-by-case basis;41 this methodology mirrors the
approach of States and other judicial bodies in their assessment of the
s Ibid., 37-
36 Ibid., 35-
37 Ibid., 39-
s8 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 39-40.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 34, 39.
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scope of direct participation in hostilities. U.S. and Australian military
manuals both cite the need for "case-by-case" analysis of DPH.42 The
Court did not go into detail regarding the criteria for membership of a
terrorist group or assumption of combat function. In contrast, the
ICRC's examination of DPH did go into such detail.
A. The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on DPH
The Interpretive Guidance43 issued by the ICRC focused on three
questions: (1) who is a civilian for the purposes of the principle of
distinction? (2) what conduct amounts to direct participation in
hostilities? and (3) what modalities govern the loss of protection
against direct attack?44 The Guidance defines civilians as "all persons
who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict
nor participants in a lev6e en masse."45 Such persons are "entitled to
protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities." 46 This definition is essentially
straightforward in relation to civilians in international armed
conflicts.
42 The U.S. Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations states that, "[d]irect
participation in hostilities must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Some examples include
taking up arms or otherwise trying to kill, injure, or capture enemy personnel or destroy
enemy property. Also civilians serving as lookouts or guards, or intelligence agents for
military forces may be considered to be directly participating in hostilities." The U.S. Naval
War College, "The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations," http://
www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-odefea93325c/1-14M
%28Ju_ 2007%29_%28NWP%29 (accessed October 15, 2012); the Australian manual
states "[c]ivilians are only protected as long as they refrain from taking a direct part in
hostilities. Whether or not a civilian is involved in hostilities is a difficult question, which
must be determined by the facts of each individual case. Civilians bearing arms and taking
part in military operations are clearly taking part in hostilities; civilians working in a store
on a military air base may not necessarily be taking such a direct part." Australian Defense
Force, Law ofArmed Conflict, (May 2oo6), Ch. 5.36.
43 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the Assembly of the International
Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February 2009, published in 90 IRRC 991 (2oo8)
(hereinafter DPHIG).
44 Ibid., 994.
45 Ibid., 997.
46 Ibid.
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It becomes more complicated when one looks at how to define a
civilian in a non-international armed conflict. The instruments that
deal with non-international armed conflict-Common Article 3 and
Protocol II-acknowledge but do not authorize participation in armed
conflict. Thus, there is no clear distinction between combatant and
civilian amongst non-State actors engaged in a non-international
armed conflict. The Interpretive Guidance on participation in non-
international armed conflict is accordingly more complex than that for
international armed conflict:
All persons who are not members of State armed forces
or organised armed groups of a party to the conflict are
civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against
direct attack unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities. In non-international armed
conflict, armed groups constitute the armed forces of a
non-State party to the conflict and consist only of
individuals whose continuous function is to take a
direct part in hostilities ("continuous combat
function").47
The concept of "continuous combat function" was adopted to
exclude support personnel from the definition of persons taking direct
part in hostilities, unless they actually take direct part in addition to
their support roles.
Exactly what constitutes direct participation in hostilities is
defined by the Interpretive Guidance as a specific act that meets three
cumulative criteria:
(1) the act must be likely to adversely affect the military
operations of military capacity of a party to an armed
conflict or alternatively to inflict death, injury, or
destruction on persons or objects protected against
direct attack (threshold of harm); (2) there must be a
direct causal link between the act and the harm likely
to result from that act, or from a coordinated military
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part
(direct causation); and (3) the act must be specifically
designed to directly cause the required threshold of
47 Ibid., 1002.
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harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the
detriment of another (belligerent nexus).48
Again, these constitutive elements are designed to ensure that persons
who might supply subsidiary or tangential support-such as
essentially administrative or support functions-are excluded from
targeting.
Finally, the remaining part of the overall test is that of "modalities
governing loss of protection." The Guidance states that civilians
directly participating will lose their protected status for the duration
of each act of direct participation. Higher-level members of organized
groups do not have this "revolving door" of protection and loss of
protection. As long as such persons are deemed to be assuming a
continuous combat function, they will remain targets. 49 This loss of
protection for individual acts includes a temporal element-
"measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct
participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return
from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that
act."50 Thus, travel to and return from an act of DPH is included in the
window for loss of protection.
As of this writing, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance remains the
most recent attempt to define the concept of direct participation in
hostilities. While the Interpretive Guidance has been the subject of
some criticism,51 it is nonetheless a valuable tool in the on-going
debate regarding the scope of the concept of "direct participation in
hostilities." With this extant debate in mind, the next section analyzes
the idea of direct participation in the context of cyber hostilities.
48 Ibid., ioi6.
49 Ibid., 1034-35.
5o Ibid., 1031.
51 See generally, W. Hays Parks, "Part IX of the ICRC 'Direct Participation in Hostilities'
Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect," New York University Journal of
International Law 42 (Spring 20o); Kenneth Watkin, "Opportunity Lost: Organized
Armed Groups and the ICRC 'Direct Participation in Hostilities Interpretive Guidance,"
New York University Journal ofInternational Law 42 (Spring 2010).
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IV. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN CYBER HOSTILITIES
As noted in the Targeted Killings case, "it is possible to take part
in hostilities without using weapons at all."52 Thus, while the means of
warfare may be profoundly different in 2012 to those used in 1907, the
effects of such means of warfare are essentially similar. A military
communications system is rendered equally inoperative if it is
disabled by a computer virus rather than a bombing raid. Indeed,
computer network attacks (CNA)53 and computer network exploitation
(CNE)54 were both discussed by the ICRC during the DPH process,
leading to the assessment that "electronic interference with military
computer networks could . . . suffice [as DPH], whether through
computer network attacks (CNA) or computer network exploitation
(CNE), as well as wiretapping the adversary's high command or
transmitting tactical targeting information for attack."55
It is therefore possible to conceive of examples of cyber-
participation in hostilities. For the purposes of this next section of the
paper, an "effects-based" approach regarding determining direct
participation in hostilities is chosen; DPH will be assessed on the
intended or actual effect produced by the act in question. This
approach is supported by State practice and case law,56 and is affirmed
52 Targeted Killings, 33.
as Defined as "operations to disrupt, dent, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computer and networks themselves." Jean-
Frangois Qu6guiner, Background Paper, Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, International Committee of the Red Cross, (Geneva:
ICRC, 2003) http://www.icre.org/eng/assets/files/other/2003-02-background-document-
icrc.pdf 15.
54 Defined as "the ability to gain access to information hosted on information systems and
the ability to make use of the system itself." Ibid.
55 DPHIG, 1017-18.
56 See, the ICTY in Strugar, where the Chamber defined DPH as "acts of war which by their
nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the
enemy's armed forces." Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-ol-42-A, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (2008), 176-79. The Chamber drew on
numerous sources in support of its statement, including military manuals from numerous
countries, international tribunal judgments, U.S. Military Commission decisions, State
practice and reports, and decisions of human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. See, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third
Report on the Human Rights Situation in Columbia, (1999), http://www.cidh.org/
countryrep/Colom99en/chapter.4a.htm (accessed October 15, 2012), ch. 4 B.2.d. 53. ("It
is generally understood in humanitarian law that the phrase 'direct participation in
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by the ICRC in the Commentary to the Additional Protocols. 57
Additionally, due to the constraints of space, this section will focus on
CNA/CNE conducted against clear military objectives, rather than
attacks against quasi-military or governmental sites, such as state-run
newspapers.
Elaborating on possible examples of direct participation, the ICTY
noted
Examples of active or direct participation in hostilities
include: bearing, using or taking up arms, taking part
in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or
operations, armed fighting or combat, participating in
attacks against enemy personnel, property or
equipment, transmitting military information for the
immediate use of a belligerent, transporting weapons
in proximity to combat operations, and serving as
guards, intelligence agents, lookouts, or observers on
behalf of military forces.58
Given such examples, a number of cyberwar scenarios can be
theorized.
A. A Civilian Contracted by the Armed Forces or Other Party to the
Conflict to Write Malicious Code or Otherwise Engage in CNA/CNE
This scenario is similar to the CIA practice of using civilians to
pilot drones in targeted killing strikes,5 or the employment of private
military and security contractors (PMSCs) in places such as
Afghanistan and Iraq.60 The ICRC Interpretive Guidance specifically
hostilities' means acts which, by their nature or purpose, are intended to cause actual harm
to enemy personnel and material.").
57 AP Commentary, 618.
58 Strugar, 176-179.
59 See, David S. Cloud, "Combat by Camera: Civilian Contractors Playing Key Roles in U.S.
Drone Operations," The Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2011.
60 See, Peter W. Singer, Can't Win With 'Em, Can't Got to War Without 'Em: Private
Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency, in the Bookings Institute Foreign Policy
Paper Series, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/9/
27militarycontractors/o927militarycontractors.
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addresses the issue of PMSCs, civilian employees and DPH in
international armed conflict, stating that:
as long as they are not incorporated into the armed
forces, private contractors and civilian employees do
not cease to be civilians simply because they
accompany the armed forces and or assume functions
other than the conduct of hostilities that would
traditionally have been performed by military
personnel .... A different conclusion must be reached
for contractors and employees who, to all intent and
purposes, have been incorporated into the armed forces
of a party to the conflict, whether through a formal
procedure under national law or de facto by being
given a continuous combat function . . . . [S]uch
personnel would be members of an organised armed
force, group or unit under a command responsible to a
party to the conflict and ... would no longer qualify as
civilians.61
Thus, while civilians employed to generally maintain computer
networks for an armed force (in the capacity of general IT services
such as email, websites, etc.) would likely not be considered as taking
direct part in cyber hostilities, any employee or contractor who was
specifically employed to conduct hostile CNA/CNE would, in theory,
be considered as taking direct part in hostilities.
B. A Civilian Unilaterally Engaging in CNA/CNEfor the Purposes of
Disrupting Networks and Gathering Information
This example is based on specific behavior that occurred during
the cyber-attacks against Georgia in 2008. Russian websites and blogs
posted instructions on how to set up computers to automatically run
61 The Guidance goes on to note that the statements regarding PMSCs and civilian
employees in international armed conflicts "also apply, mutatis mutandis, in non-
international armed conflicts." DPHIG, 1010-11.
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distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), 62 some even offering
downloadable DDoS programs. 63
As such, civilians unilaterally engaging in hostile cyber-attacks,
without being specifically instructed by or answerable to a party to
conflict, would likely fulfill the criteria for DPH. Any acts undertaken
by such persons, with the intent or effect of rendering the targeted
networks vulnerable or inoperative, have directly participated in the
same way as if they were conducting a "traditional" kinetic attack to
damage or destroy a military base or airfield.
C. A Civilian Who Writes the Malware Program and Gives It to the
Armed Forces or Other Party to the Conflict, but Does Not Personally
Execute the Malware
The ICRC Guidance seems to suggest that such acts-by someone
who creates the mechanism through which a destructive act is
executed, but is not involved beyond the construction phase-would
not amount to direct participation, in that the "causation" test would
not be met. The Guidance states:
individual conduct that merely builds up or maintains
the capacity of a party to harm its adversary . . . is
excluded from the concept of direct participation in
hostilities . . . . [Examples of non-DPH] include
scientific research and design, as well as production
and transport of weapons and equipment. 64
However, the experts involved in the DPH process were
"divided"65 as to whether civilian scientists and weapons experts could
always be considered as not taking direct part. For instance, some
were of the opinion that constructing improvised explosive devices
62 See, Evgeny Morozov, "An Army of Ones and Zeroes: How I Became a Soldier in the
Georgia-Russia Cyber War," Slate, August 14, 2008, http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/technology/2008/08/an-army of ones and zeroes.html.
63 Ibid.; see also, Asher Moses, "Georgian Websites Forced Offline in Cyber War," The
Sydney Morning Herald, August 12, 2008, http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/
georgian-websites-forced-offline-in-cyber-war/2008/o8/12/12183o6848654.html.
64 DPHIG, 1021-22.
65 International Committee of the Red Cross, Summary Report, Fourth Expert Meeting on
the Notion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities, (Geneva, 2008) 48.
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could be considered as exceeding mere capacity-building and amount
to a measure "preparatory to a concrete military operation." 66 In
theory, one would therefore treat such programmers as civilians not
taking direct part, so long as they are not directly involved in
executing the program themselves.
D. A Civilian Who Writes or Deploys Malware for Criminal Purposes
or for the Purposes of Creating Mischief but Who Has No Specific
Nexus to the Hostilities
In some instances, systems are hacked simply for criminal,
malicious, or mischievous reasons, with no nexus to the armed
conflict; sites and networks are targeted simply because they can be. 67
In such a case, the appropriate response would lie with domestic law
enforcement, rather than under the law of armed conflict. 68 However,
persons engaged in CNA/CNE during an armed conflict would
nonetheless put themselves at risk of being targeted, as their attacks
would be difficult to differentiate from attacks being conducted by
persons with a connection to the hostilities.
E. A Civilian Who Provides Technical Support for Someone Engaging
in Cyber-Hostilities
Finally, one may consider whether the provision of technical or
logistical support could amount to direct participation in hostilities.
For example, it is possible now to outsource one's personal IT support
issues to corporations. Major companies, like the U.S. corporation
Best Buy, offer remote and in-home IT assistance through subsidiaries
like "Geek Squad." 69 Thus, a civilian engaging in cyber-hostilities,
66 Ibid., at 48-60.
67 The vernacular term is "black hat hacker"-see for example, CNN.com, "Timeline: A
Forty Year History of Hacking," CNN Tech, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-11-19/tech/
hack.history.idgi-phone-phreaks-chaos-computer-club-emmanuel-goldstein?_s=
PM:TECH.
68 For example, the U.K. has specifically banned DDoS attacks under § 36 of the Police and
Justice Act of 2oo6. The Police and Justice Act, 2006, § 36. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2oo6/48/section/36; see generally, Tom Espiner, "U.K. Outlaws Denial-of-Service
Attacks," Cnet, http://news.cnet.com/U.K.-outlaws-denial-of-service-attacks/210-7348
3-6134472.html.
69 See, The Geek Squad, "About Us," http://www.geeksquad.com/about-us.
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confronted with a sudden technical problem they were unable to
personally solve, might solicit the help of an external contractor.
Would such an external contractor be participating in hostilities?
What if the person engaging in cyber-hostilities mentioned what they
were doing to the contractor? Would that mean that the contractor
was now directly participating in hostilities? Based on a reading of the
ICRC DPH guidance, as well as the Israeli Supreme Court decision on
direct participation for the purposes of targeted killing, it would seem
that such technical support would be too remote to amount to direct
participation. Even if such a technician was "on-board" with the idea
of engaging in cyber-war, and encouraged the civilian participant to
do as much damage as possible, it seems that the technician would
still fail to fulfill all the cumulative criteria required for the DPH test.
This was noted by Turns, who argues that the provision of technical
support to someone engaged in cyber-war would likely be too remote
for the purposes of causation and threshold of harm.70 Indeed, even
on-going and regular technical support provided by a contractor to the
military would not amount to direct participation in cyber-hostilities
because computer systems would need on-going maintenance.
Computer maintenance would likely amount to "individual conduct
that merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party to harm its
adversary . . . [and thus] is excluded from the concept of direct
participation in hostilities."71
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is hard to imagine any situation where a person involved in
creating or deploying malware in an armed conflict situation could not
be considered as taking direct part in hostilities. Malware is by
definition designed to damage the target computer or computers. It
would be difficult to argue that any person involved in the creation
and execution of a malicious code was somehow unaware of the
programs' intent. Perhaps the only scenario that would fit into such a
situation might be a courier, involved in physically transporting
hardware (computers or USB sticks loaded with malware) from the
programmer to the person or persons ultimately executing the
malware.
70 David Turns, "Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,"
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 17 (2012): 295.
71 DPHIG, 1021.
18 [Vol. 9: 1
CRAWFORD
However, any response to a CNA/CNE would need to be
proportionate to the initial attack. A CNA/CNE that crashed purely
commercial websites would arguably not justify an armed response.
Where no physical casualties result, a proportionate response to a
CNA/CNE would likely be limited to a counter-CNA/CNE against
hacker computers and networks. This, of course, raises additional
problems with regards to how, and against whom, an appropriate
response can be directed. DPH in any kind of hostilities remains a
dangerous endeavor; the uncertainties in both law and practice in
cyber hostilities make such participation especially problematic. The
recent publication, in draft form, of the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, has provided some
guidance on this question of direct participation in cyber hostilities.72
At the time of writing of this article, a detailed analysis of the Tallinn
Manual has not been undertaken. The drafters of the Manual have
thus begun the important and complex process of clarifying the
situation, so that civilians and the military may better know the
parameters in which we operate in this new "cybered" realm.
72 See, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, draft, Tallinn Manual on
The International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Michael N. Schmitt ed., (Cambridge,
2013), 83-91, https://www.cedcoe.org/249.html.
2013] 19

